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Executive Summary
Cities are an important determinant of state economic
performance. As a consequence, states that ignore the eco-
nomic well-being of their cities risk falling behind. Cities
whose economies are stagnant, whose residents suffer from
poverty and unemployment, whose budgets are in chronic
fiscal stress, and who require state aid to sustain basic serv-
ices are a drag on the entire state economy. Cities whose
economies are vibrant, whose residents are productive,
whose budgets are fiscally stable, and who do not require
massive infusions of state aid are assets to the entire state.
Our study examines the relationship between states and
their cities and the impact of state activity on cities. To under-
stand how states can help cities — and thereby themselves
— succeed, the George Washington Institute of Public Policy
and Cleveland State University’s Office of Economic
Development began a study of state policies that contribute
to successful urban performance. As background for this
paper, we visited seven states (California, Illinois, Michigan,
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington; see
Box 1 on p. 5 for selection criteria). As a result of our research
in these states, we identified a set of principles that, when
they serve as guides to state actions and policies, can help
cities prosper and at the same time benefit all state residents.
The body of this report presents the rationale for our con-
tention that these principles should guide state behavior
toward cities. The first part of the report sets forth a variety
of generalizations (which we term principles) about the kinds
of approaches that are likely — and the kinds that are unlike-
ly — to help cities achieve success. We also look at a num-
ber of specific state and city programs that seem consistent
with these principles. In the last portion of the paper we
focus on policy domains that are important to cities and sum-
marize what we have learned about state activities in these
areas. We also discuss the principles as they relate to hous-
ing and housing affordability, community development,
economic and workforce development, education, and
transportation.
A summary of the study’s main findings follows. We begin
with two principles that we found to be prerequisites for
success.
Vision and leadership are the foundations of success.
Time and again we found that in cities that had successfully
transformed their economic and residential base, vigorous
leadership was present and was driven by a well-articulated
vision. At times, that vision was seated in the state house;
other times, it was located at city hall and/or in the commu-
nity. In city after city where progress had occurred, vision
and leadership, sustained over time and backed by
resources, played a decisive role.
State government understanding of the importance of
cities and the nature of productive state-city coopera-
tion is essential. In most of the states that we visited, we
did not come across any comprehensive expression of an
“urban policy.” However, in states whose cities were suc-
cessful, we found productive and cooperative state-city
relationships coalesced around specific programs and
focused on well-defined problems. In other states, the rela-
tionship between states and their cities was characterized
by, at best, benign neglect.
Based on our research as well as a review of literature, we
believe the next set of principles should guide state govern-
ment behavior toward their cities. These principles include:
Do no harm. The Hippocratic Oath deserves a privileged
place among the tenets guiding state governments. At a
minimum, states should abstain from activity that harms
cities. Given the need, sometimes, to implement policies
that benefit the state overall but do not necessarily benefit
cities (and may even harm them), states should at least be
aware of any potentially adverse impact on cities and should
take this into account when making decisions. At the very
least, the state has a responsibility to provide local govern-
ment and city interests (mayors, city caucuses in the state
legislature, professional associations representing local gov-
ernment and city interests) with the opportunity to express
their concerns.
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States and Their Cities
Partnerships for the Future
Do the basics well. State government is responsible for a
set of core functions, which, if performed well, benefit both
cities and the state as a whole. These include providing:
 A modern, productive, and integrated infrastructure that
promotes growth
 A high-quality, state-funded higher education system that
educates state residents, attracts out-of-state students,
and promotes research and development
 High standards and expectations for the K-12 public edu-
cation system and a state education finance system that
provides all districts with the resources necessary to
meet those standards and expectations
 An effective criminal justice system
 Well-managed state government departments and
agencies, transparent state government processes and
procedures, and honest, law-abiding state government
officials
Promote home rule while exercising responsible over-
sight. States should support local government choice,
innovation, and flexibility, but also provide effective and
responsible oversight. State governments cannot administer
and manage city governments, but they can provide the tools
that make effective home rule possible. At the same time,
irresponsible local government behavior can harm the entire
state by raising the costs of living and of production, creating
political crisis, or inhibiting economic change. Some form of
proactive state fiscal oversight is both prudent and necessary.
Arrangements consistent with this principle include:
 States should grant cities some degree of autonomy in
determining the form of municipal government.
 States should make it easy for cities to annex land and
difficult for areas surrounding cities to incorporate.
 States should permit local governments to impose more
than one type of major local tax.
 States should not impose extreme limits on local govern-
ment spending and revenue-raising.
 States must recognize that local governments are part of
an overall state-local fiscal system; transferring state fis-
cal problems to local governments (by reducing state
general aid to local governments, for example) relocates
the problem rather than solving it.
Be innovative. States should engage in innovation and
experimentation in the development of urban policy and
should encourage cities to experiment as well. One of the
most compelling arguments for the federal system is that the
states can serve as laboratories for experimentation or “labo-
ratories of democracy,” as Judge Louis Brandeis termed
them. The body of this report details a wide range of promis-
ing innovations that we found during our site visits.
Be focused. State policies toward cities should be strategic
and focused. In some states, urban policy is little more than
a collection of small, poorly funded programs designed to
express concern for the problems of cities. In most cases
such programs are just too small, scattershot, or ill-conceived
to have real impact.
Think regionally. States should encourage problem solving
at the regional level for problems that affect the entire region
or have spillover effects from one jurisdiction to others.
Eliminate funding inequities. States should provide an
equalization grant to local governments to compensate for
differences in local tax capacities.
Seek a balance between change and continuity. It is
difficult for cities to pursue a successful vision or to project
stability if they must contend with frequent, unanticipated,
and sometimes dramatic discontinuities in state policy.
Nobody would reasonably argue that partisan changes in
state control should not occur or should not be accompanied
by policy changes. That said, there are several forms of insta-
bility that limit the ability of cities to contribute to the econom-
ic and social development of the state.
 Newly elected state leaders, both governors and legisla-
tors, should evaluate the effectiveness of existing state
programs that affect cities, retaining and improving those
that are working, even if they are associated with the
policies of the opposing party.
 Tax limits, expenditure limits, and term limits introduce
instability into the management and governance of cities.
The initiative and referendum process, which played a
major role in three of the states we visited (California,
Oregon, and Washington) and a moderate role in
Michigan, is another generator of sharp and unexpected
discontinuities to which cities must adjust. California’s
Proposition 13 and its effects serve as a good example of
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fiscal instability, which we term “mandated public policy
incoherence.”
We also looked at specific policy areas in each state and,
based on our examination, have formulated a series of
recommendations:
 States should actively encourage cities to think of hous-
ing as an integral part of development efforts — especial-
ly downtown development.
 States should recognize that one size does not fit all:
State policy must respect the diversity among cities. This
is particularly the case with vitality and amenity packages.
State policy should recognize the importance of each
city’s uniqueness — the characteristics that set it apart
from all other cities.
 States should provide local governments with the tools
they need, including local economic development tools.
However, states should not provide tools (such as local
tax concessions) that encourage local governments to
compete against one another.
 In view of the potential importance of universities in state
and urban economic and workforce development, states
should develop, sustain, and adequately fund high-quality
university systems. States should see their universities
not only as a means of educating the children of existing
residents but also as a way to attract talent from else-
where.
 States should ensure that all children have access to an
adequate education and are not denied access as a result
of insufficient income or the weak tax base of the school
district in which they live.
 States should make state transportation funding to local
governments as flexible as possible so that cities retain
the authority to determine the best use of these funds.
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State Governments and Their Cities:
What Do States Have at Stake?
State economies exist within a fiercely competitive interna-
tional environment, an environment that no longer rewards
business-as-usual approaches. In this global economy, cities
are an increasingly important determinant of state economic
performance. States that ignore the economic well-being of
their cities will pay dearly, because cities are at the heart of
real economies of goods and service production and innova-
tion. From the perspective of economic geography, state
economies really do not exist. A state’s economy is an amal-
gam of metropolitan-based regional economies and rural
natural resource economies. This simple fact is critical to
understanding the role of cities in the knowledge-intensive
economy of the future.
Cities are frequently viewed in stereotypical terms, with two
diametrically opposed stereotypes prevailing:
 Stereotype 1: Nirvana cities. America’s large central cities
are the key to the economic future of the nation and are
central to wealth building in the states. Cities house the
creative class, gather scarce talent from all corners of the
globe, give birth to the industries of the future in univer-
sity test tubes, hospitals, and recycled industrial lofts.
Employers are rediscovering cities because what they
need most to succeed is talent, and that talent no longer
prefers to live and work huddled next to the exit ramps
of metropolitan highway systems. If a state does not
have healthy and vital cities, it will miss out on the next
economic era.
 Stereotype 2: Apocalyptic cities. America’s large central
cities are drags on the finances of state governments.
They are havens for the nation’s undereducated and are
littered with the abandoned wreckage of the industrial
past, with outdated public sector work habits, uncompet-
itive tax rates, and failed public schools. The redistributive
politics of the past have found sanctuary in the remnants
of a political coalition that is dying nationally and is more
interested in protecting public sector jobs than in provid-
ing services to the public. As soon as they feel concern
for their children’s education and safety, knowledge
workers drive to family friendly suburbs where the quali-
ty of schools trumps the entertainment cravings of par-
ents. Once new-economy firms have incubated, they
search for suburban campus environments close to the
homes of their CEOs and key employees.
Like all stereotypes, these are simplifications; and, like all
stereotypes, each contains a bit of truth. The fact is that
states have huge economic interests in their cities, and cities
cannot operate effectively without the full partnership of their
state governments. Cities whose economies are stagnant,
whose residents suffer from poverty and unemployment,
whose budgets are in chronic fiscal stress, and require state
aid to sustain basic services are a drag on the entire state
economy. Cities whose economies are vibrant, whose resi-
dents are productive, whose budgets are fiscally stable and
do not require massive infusions of state aid are assets to the
entire state.
The economy is a relentless, self-healing system of invest-
ment that writes down and writes off assets that no longer
provide value, discards what does not work, and invests in
and supports what does work. Governors could leave the
decline of cities to mayors of another party. But in the long
run, doing so will be costly. The fact is that the state wins if
cities succeed, and the state’s viability comes into question if
its cities fail.
The question for states, then, is whether their cities will rep-
resent costs — part of the social overhead burden that must
be borne by the entire state, or assets — areas where inno-
vation, entrepreneurship, productivity, and opportunity will
flourish and drive the state as a whole. Over the course of the
past half-century, too many of our cities have become costs,
degraded assets that impose burdens not only on their own
residents but on the state as a whole.
Obviously, state governments do not bear sole responsibility
for the good or bad performances of their cities. This is not a
one-way street. There are many factors that are likely to be
as important or more important than state actions and poli-
cies — a city’s own policies, the effectiveness and compe-
tence of its government, the vision (or lack thereof) of its
elected officials and its major civic leaders, its history and cul-
ture, the industrial legacy and economic structure that it
inherited, the industriousness and entrepreneurial skill of its
residents — and, we hasten to add, sheer good luck in terms
of its legacy, geography, natural attributes, the quality of the
companies located there, and the market demand for goods
and services that local firms produce. Nonetheless, states
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have made and can make a difference in whether cities suc-
ceed and whether they drive overall state economic perform-
ance or serve as a drag.
Cities have choices to make in terms of their patterns and
practices of governing and operating. Will older, formerly
industrial cities, with histories of political machines that give
public employment primacy over effective and efficient
service delivery, continue to practice the politics of patronage
— a politics of managing their decline? Or will they create a
different future with a more cooperative bargaining style and
programmatic accountability and be willing to practice the
politics of performance — a politics that means change in
their policies, practices, and cost structures? If not, the econ-
omy will continue to bypass them.
In this report, we report on lessons learned from intensive
case study research performed by scholars at the George
Washington Institute of Public Policy at the George
Washington University, and at Cleveland State University’s
Office of Economic Development. As background for this
report, we visited seven states (see Methodology, below).
While performance was mixed in all states, most of the cities
in Oregon, North Carolina, Illinois, andWashington performed
better than expected from 1990 to 2000 in terms of income,
population, and job growth, and worse than expected in
terms of housing affordability. In California and Michigan, we
saw the opposite pattern of performance. And in
Pennsylvania, cities largely performed poorly across the
board.
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Methodology: HowWere the Case Study Cities and States Selected?
To understand how states can help cities and thereby themselves succeed, the George Washington Institute of Public
Policy and Cleveland State University’s Office of Economic Development began a study of states and state policies that
contribute to successful urban performance.
We began by analyzing typical urban performance indicators (e.g., per capita income, jobs, poverty rates) for the 325
central cities that had 1990 populations of at least 50,000. Using statistical models that analyzed changes in these indi-
cators for our cities during the 1990s, we projected what these cities would look like in 2000, given their demograph-
ic, economic, and social characteristics in 1990. We then calculated their actual change on the indicators from 1990-
2000 and identified cities that performed either markedly better or markedly worse than what we had projected. (For
more on our methodology, findings on predicted and actual city performance and our analysis, see our paper present-
ed at the Urban Affairs Association conference in 2005.1)
In the process, we recognized several states in which most cities had either overperformed or underachieved their
projected performance. In order to determine the role of state governments (both beneficial and adverse) in these
unusually high- and low-performing cities, we selected states from both categories for more intensive analysis, includ-
ing California, Illinois, Michigan, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington, and two cities in each state
(one in Oregon).2 Illinois’ cities performed close to the predictions of the model, but the state was selected due to the
perception of many that Chicago and its satellite cities were places that were on the move and had unusually strong
performance from 2000 on. To discover how states contribute to successful urban performance, we conducted case
studies in each of the states, visiting both the cities and state capitals to interview state and city elected and appoint-
ed officials, members of professional associations and interest groups, academics and researchers, journalists, and
other knowledgeable observers. We also conducted focus group sessions with four expert panels in Washington, D.C.,
and at least one such session in each of the states we visited.
While the statistical work that we used to identify our case study states and cities utilized city performance data from
1990-2000, the interviews, case studies, and expert panels were not confined to that time period. Our quest was to
understand the role states have played and continue to play right up to the present in terms of city performance. These
case studies and expert panels form the basis for our findings and conclusions.
As we visited, we began to observe a number of principles
that, as the drivers of state action and policy, helped cities
prosper while benefiting state residents in general.
As a result of our observations, we have extracted a set of
principles that are useful in guiding state activities with
respect to cities. These principles are general guides to
action. In addition to these principles, we derived more spe-
cific lessons from our visits that we present in the form of
policy recommendations.
The successful state-city partnerships that we observed
shared two common elements that we saw frequently
enough that we term them prerequisites for success. First,
there was a workable vision of the future, based on the self-
interest of those involved, that was adopted by succeeding
state administrations and embraced by local community lead-
ers. Second, the state government and cities recognized that
they had a stake in each other’s success and that effective
cooperation was important to that success.
Prerequisite 1: Vision and Leadership Are the
Foundations of Success
Vision for the city’s future is critical: Cities must be able
to build upon their history without being prisoners of past
practices. Time and again, we learned that in cities that had
successfully transformed their economic and residential
base, vigorous leadership was present and was driven by a
well-articulated vision. At times, that vision was seated in the
state house; other times, it was located at city hall and/or in
the community.
Economic development time is measured by how long it
takes to change the structure of the regional economy; this is
much longer than political time, which is the length of the
political election cycle. Vision and leadership are the two fac-
tors that bridge these two time scales.
We observed, in city after city where progress was made,
that a few key players with vision and resources make a dif-
ference. While we acknowledge that leadership in a city or
state matters, we less often appreciate the vital role that a
deeply held vision, appropriate for a city and sustained over
time, plays in bringing about long-term city success. This kind
of vision leads cities to a clear identity, distinct from that of
other cities.
How did this vision manifest itself in our successful cities? In
several of the cities and states we visited, the strategic and
targeted investment of public funds was a key component of
the vision that leaders articulated and embraced. For
instance, for nearly half a century North Carolina has
sustained a vision for developing a knowledge-based,
technology-rich economy rooted in the quality of its higher
education system, community colleges, and the Research
Triangle Park, a vision that has nourished the development of
cities in the Durham-Chapel Hill-Raleigh area.
At the southern end of the state, the extraordinary vision of
Hugh McColl, the CEO of NationsBank (which merged with
Bank of America in 1998), supported by CEO Ed Crutchfield
from First Union (later to merge with Wachovia) and William
Lee, CEO of Duke Power, led to the revitalization of the city
of Charlotte. Based on his experience in London, McColl
believed early on that he could not have a great bank without
a great city. As a result, his vision centered on creating a
vibrant city, which involved creating amenities for his employ-
ees in the downtown, changing low-income and blighted
neighborhoods into safe, attractive, mixed-income communi-
ties, and generally improving the quality of life throughout the
city. Charlotte’s turnaround began when this private vision
took hold in the public arena, in part due to
supportive state policies and in part due to the ability of the
public and private sectors to advance a mutually beneficial
vision.
In Oregon, Tom McCall’s gubernatorial vision was to protect
the region from “coastal condo-mania, sagebrush subdivi-
sions and the ravenous rampage of suburbia.”3 Together, he
and Portland Mayor and later Governor Neil Goldschmidt
advanced this vision by crafting policies that encouraged
urban development and redevelopment in existing urban
areas while simultaneously preserving farmland, open space,
and natural resources. The well-known “urban growth area”
of Portland arose from this commitment to preserving the
environment and preventing land-consumptive, low-quality
new development. This visionary leadership has guided the
Portland area for more than 30 years in its development as an
environmentally conscious, non-automobile-oriented culture
known for its “new urbanism.” Portland’s accomplishments
in terms of housing initiatives, transportation investment, and
land acquisition can be largely attributed to the visionary lead-
ership of its politicians and the working partnership between
the city and the state house.
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Mayor Daley’s vision of Chicago, described to us as “a mar-
riage of quality of life and a good place for families to live,
work, and play,” has guided Chicago’s success story over the
past 15 years. Purposeful investment, coupled with a clear
articulation of the objectives associated with that investment,
create a sense of direction and efficacy. Multibillion dollar
investments in infrastructure are credited with bringing
neighborhoods back to life. As Terry Nichols Clark observed
in the introduction to his book on the post-industrial city, “In
the 1980s and 1990s, Chicago’s government changed hugely,
perhaps more than in all previous decades of the twentieth
century …The younger Daley (Daley II) has increasingly
stressed making the city a good place to live, as well as work
…His park and tree-building efforts symbolize the drastic shift
in thinking about the city, its people, and politics. It symbol-
izes a broader effort to recognize the interdependence of the
human and natural environment, to elevate aesthetic and
consumption concerns to a par, or better, with those of mak-
ing a living, and to redirect political vision away from
exchanges between self-interested individuals toward the
public good. This is a political revolution, all the more dramat-
ic as it has happened silently, largely undeclared and under
recognized, [sic].”4 As for the state, it has given Daley and
Chicago freedom to invest in itself, and the mayor has been
given more authority over the schools, including the key abil-
ity to revamp the hiring system and to give principals and par-
ents greater power.
Leadership vision in Aurora, Ill., dates back more than 30
years to Mayor Albert McCoy, who had the foresight in 1973
to annex a huge parcel of land — the second largest annexa-
tion in the state’s history, after the O’Hare Airport annexation
— that became Fox Valley Mall. In the 1980s, Mayor Jack Hill,
who saw both residential and business development as criti-
cal to the city’s future, created an economic development
commission. Hill, a former union steward, changed the city’s
zoning laws to prevent the conversion of single-family homes
and instituted other laws that created strict health and safety
standards for multiple-unit buildings. Subsequent Aurora
leaders have built upon that visionary foundation, bringing to
town a casino and housing attractive to Chicago commuters.
Mayor Norm Rice’s vision for the redevelopment of Seattle’s
downtown, with its focus on creating an “18-hour” down-
town, is similarly viewed as a successful revitalization effort.
The strategy entailed making transportation changes that
favored shoppers and residents over commuters, bringing
retail back to the downtown core, and encouraging residen-
tial development through rezoning and affordable housing
subsidies. Under Rice’s leadership, the city also formed a
partnership with the Downtown Seattle Association. The
partnership made additional investments in public projects
downtown, including infrastructure investment and stadium
construction.
Tacoma, Washington, experienced a renaissance of sorts dur-
ing the 1990s as a result of a sustained partnership between
city government officials and prominent civic leaders. The
vision for the revitalization of Tacoma’s downtown originated
with the Executive Council for Greater Tacoma, a small set of
the city’s large business leaders’ council. The council com-
missioned a study for the redevelopment of the Foss
Waterway, which bordered Tacoma’s corporate downtown
and had been identified as a Superfund site, into an area that
combined commercial development with museums, retail,
and residential development. The partnership with the city
provided the crucial element needed to bring the council’s
vision to fruition. The city bought the waterfront property,
took responsibility for the cleanup effort, and issued bonds to
pay for the reconstruction of the historic Union Station build-
ing, which now houses federal courts. The council was also
responsible for convincing the University of Washington to
place its Tacoma branch downtown instead of in the suburbs.
All of the examples of vision and leadership discussed above
share a common quality. Each vision shaped politics and
investments for years, if not decades, to come. The vision
that can be traced to an individual or an administration outlast-
ed its author’s tenure and became an essential part of the
civic fabric. Portland’s commitment to quality architecture and
urban design did not come about by accident; it was inten-
tional. Chicago’s commitment to quality of life, green invest-
ment, and public transportation transcended Daley’s first
mayoral campaign and became a civic expectation. Aurora’s
commitment to its downtown as a quality live-work environ-
ment was more than a tactic supported by a casino; it was an
intentional change in future expectations. Charlotte’s drive to
urban sophistication that reflects its regional culture was also
intentional. Each of these intentions served as a widely
shared, aggressive, yet obtainable vision that shaped the
investments and politics that followed.
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Prerequisite 2: State Government
Understanding of the Importance of State-City
Cooperation Is Essential
In most of the states that we visited, we did not come across
any comprehensive expression of an “urban policy”
(although we would argue that all states have an unarticulat-
ed urban policy in that a wide variety of their activities affect
cities, albeit unintentionally) or of the need for cooperative
state-city relationships. However, that does not mean that
such relationships did not exist or were not important.
Instead, productive and cooperative state-city relationships
coalesced around specific programs and well-defined
challenges.
Illinois, where a succession of governors, both Republican
and Democratic, has engaged in close and effective interac-
tion with Chicago, is a good example of this. Republican
governor James Thompson (1977–1991) was able to work
effectively with Democrats, including Harold Washington and
Richard M. Daley. As John Coyne observed, “Many
Republicans who do business in Chicago believe he
[Thompson] has handled the city as well as can be expected.
And they give him high marks for working behind the scenes
with Mayor Daley and House Speaker Mike Madigan of
Chicago to bring off the sleight-of-hand tax increase that
made Chicago’s unprecedented public-school reform
program possible.”5
Governor George H. Ryan, also a Republican, helped pass
subsidies to bring Boeing to Chicago, and it was under his
administration that the legislature passed Illinois First, a $12
billion public works program commonly perceived as
extremely favorable to Chicago.
In Michigan, Democrat David Hollister became mayor of
Lansing after almost 20 years in the Michigan House of
Representatives, where he was regularly in conflict with
Republican governor John Engler. Hollister and Engler set
aside their past differences and worked together to improve
the capital city, including undertaking a successful campaign
to keep a General Motors plant in Lansing. Lansing often
served as the pilot for the governor’s initiatives.
Too often, however, the big-picture relationship of state gov-
ernments with their cities can be better characterized as one
of benign neglect and, in a few situations, disdain. In
Pennsylvania, for example, a state official observed, “The
General Assembly is hostile to cities. It goes out of its way
not to help Philadelphia. Cities are just a big, dark drain.”
Similarly, a consultant in city-state fiscal relationships noted
that in California, “Public policy begins and ends with
whether it’s good or bad for the general fund.” This approach
does not produce successful cities. Several observers in
California noted the state’s lack of interest in cities: “Benign
neglect is the best you can hope for. When the state does
notice you, it’s not good news. There is no real idea on the
part of the state of the role of cities, what they should be and
can be doing.”
In North Carolina, where the state’s focus is on distressed
rural areas, a Charlotte city official complained that, “We’ve
done these things despite the state. We’re viewed as a cash
cow by the state. It’s hard to get them to pay attention,
to say ‘We are going to invest in Charlotte.’” The state is
continually nibbling away at the city’s revenue. Charlotte
wants more options for raising revenue. For example,
the state lets the counties [but not the cities] have a
local option sales tax. The state is not helpful in granting city
alternatives.”
In Portland, one city official summarized the consensus in the
region when he stated that, “Portland has been successful
despite the lack of investment from the state.” And in
Pennsylvania, one policy-maker noted that the state’s smaller
cities, in particular, “are suffering from neglect by the state.”
Principles for State Relationships
toward Cities
Do No Harm
At a minimum, states should strive not to engage in activity
that harms cities. Given the need, sometimes, to implement
policies that benefit the state overall but harm cities, states
should at least be aware of any potential adverse impact on
cities and take that impact into account when making their
decisions. States have a responsibility to provide local gov-
ernment and city interests (mayors, city caucuses in the state
legislature, professional associations representing local gov-
ernment and city interests) with opportunities to express
their concerns.
We found a wide range of state actions that had an adverse
impact on cities. Some, including such fiscal limitations
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California’s Proposition 13, are obvious, since they prevent
the city and its residents from taxing themselves or spending
at the level they might prefer. Others may be more subtle.
Both Pennsylvania, through Act 111, and Michigan, through
PA 312, require compulsory arbitration in labor negotiations
between cities and their employee unions. In both states, city
officials have complained that the fiscal stress of cities is not
taken into account in arbitration decisions and that cities are
frequently saddled with expensive settlements that add an
anti-business environment and fiscal challenges. These acts
also make it very difficult to reshape municipal workforces in
the face of population declines, shifts in service demands, or
changes in technologies.
Education is another area in which states may inadvertently
shortchange cities. In Oregon, for example, the state
education equalization formula, which is designed to provide
equivalent resources for all school districts, fails to take into
account the higher cost of education in Portland. Thus it
disadvantages, probably unintentionally, the city’s school sys-
tem. Portland’s higher education costs result from the need
to pay higher salaries to attract teachers as compensation for
the city’s higher cost of living as well as for the greater chal-
lenges of teaching in an inner-city school system. Similarly,
unfunded pension liabilities, a problem for all school districts
in the state, impose greater cost for the Portland school dis-
trict because of the higher pension benefits in its contract.
Many states impose unfunded mandates on their localities.
However, California’s constitution requires the state to reim-
burse local governments when the state mandates a new
local program or higher levels of service. The California
Commission on State Mandates, created in 1985, adjudicates
local jurisdictions’ claims that a state agency has imposed a
reimbursable state mandate. In 2005, for example, the
Commission found that a law on pupil promotion and reten-
tion that required policy development, special instruction, and
summer instruction constituted an unfunded mandate and
required reimbursement for the period going back to 1997.
Implementation is a separate matter, though; despite the
constitutional limitation and the commission, a 2004 report
noted that the state owed local agencies about $2 billion for
the previous year’s costs for all unfunded mandates.
Some states have gone beyond doing no harm and have tried
to help cities by locating state facilities that could have gone
elsewhere in downtown areas. In 2000, the Pennsylvania leg-
islature passed the Downtown Local Law to direct state
buildings and state-leased space into downtowns, but critics
argued that it defined the concept of downtown too broadly.
In February 2004, Governor Ed Rendell signed Executive
Order 2004-2, the Utilization of Commonwealth-Owned and
Leased Space, to reinforce the direct intent of the Downtown
Local Law. The Executive Order asserts that “agency heads
are strongly encouraged to lease space in downtown areas,
whenever possible,” noting that Pennsylvania at the time
owned approximately 11,000 buildings and its executive
agencies leased approximately 700 buildings. Michigan’s
Executive Directive 2003-22 has a similar intent: It
encourages adaptive use or rehabilitation of historic buildings
or reuse of other buildings within urban areas, use of vacant
buildings or land in urban areas, and use and rehabilitation of
brownfield areas.
Do the Basics Well
State government performs a set of core functions, which, if
performed well, can benefit cities as well as the state as a
whole. These include providing:
 A modern, productive, and integrated infrastructure that
promotes growth
 A high-quality higher education system that educates
state residents, attracts out-of state students, and pro-
motes research and development
 High standards and expectations for the state’s elemen-
tary and secondary education system and a state educa-
tion finance system that ensures that all districts have
sufficient resources to meet those standards and expec-
tations
 An effective criminal justice system
 Well-managed state government departments and agen-
cies, transparent state government processes and proce-
dures, and state government officials who are honest
and obey the law
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General Guidance for Formal
Structure and Rules of the Game
Choice with Responsibility
State rules governing local government structure should
support local government choice, innovation, and flexibility,
but include responsible state oversight. Cities, like people,
operate within a set of structures that limit and condition their
actions. As constitutional creatures of the state, cities are
subject to the limits set by the state government. Sometimes
these limits are embedded in state constitutions, and at other
times they are statutory.
State rules govern the choice of municipal government; the
city’s authority to tax, spend, and borrow; the kinds of taxes
and fees the city may impose and the process for imposing
them (whether through a vote of the council or through a ref-
erendum and, if through a referendum, whether a majority or
supermajority vote is required); the activities it can engage in
and services it can provide; the framework that defines its
authority to control land use and annex unincorporated
territory; and the framework within which it conducts labor-
management relations. These rules vary substantially from
state to state. All of them are important, and some are critical
to city performance and success.
While state governments cannot administer and manage city
governments, they provide the tools that make meaningful
home rule possible. Local grassroots democracy underpins
American democracy; indeed, it is frequently given nearly
religious obeisance. It is not necessary to recite here the
rationale for local democracy in terms of government’s role in
adequately reflecting local preferences and opinion, fostering
civic participation, and ensuring efficient administration. At
the same time, irresponsible local government behavior can
have an impact on the entire state by raising costs of living
and of production, creating political crisis, and inhibiting eco-
nomic change. Proactive state fiscal oversight of cities is both
prudent and responsible.
There is an unavoidable tension between local control and
state oversight. The state must ensure that localities are fis-
cally solvent, well managed, and law-abiding. The state must
also encourage local government to be responsive to new
service demands and to be a local problem-solver.
Fiscal Control and Local Discretion
States determine the kind of taxes that local governments
can levy and, in many cases, the maximum rate at which they
can levy them. States also place restrictions on what some
taxes can be used for. This state authority has sometimes led
to abuse and fiscally imprudent decisions that have made it
difficult for some cities to invest in their own future. These
unfortunate consequences could be averted if state legisla-
tures embraced more prudent principles when structuring
the fiscal environment for local government.
Fiscal integration
States must recognize that local governments are part of an
overall state-local fiscal system and that exporting state fis-
cal problems to local governments merely relocates the
problem rather than solving it. This principle leads to a num-
ber of recommendations. The most contentious issues
between states and cities arise through the state-local fiscal
system. That system encompasses not only state grants to
local governments but shared taxes and the extent to which
the state funds services for which local governments would
otherwise be responsible. Based on our analysis, we suggest
several corollaries to the principle of fiscal integration —
additional principles that would likely soften the tension
between states and their cities while also giving cities the
autonomy necessary to promote local economic growth and
ensure the efficient provision of services.
Choice in Local Taxation
States should permit local governments to impose more
than one type of major local tax. Local governments should
not be limited to the property tax, as they are, for example,
in Oregon. Like states, cities need a balanced tax system so
that at least a portion of their tax base will grow with the
economy (income or sales tax) while another portion will
remain relatively stable during economic downturns.
Historically, the property tax has proved the most stable,
while the income and sales taxes track the economic cycle.
Fiscal Discretion
States should not impose extreme limits on local
government revenue. In Oregon and Washington (through
limitations on the property tax) and in California, where the
initiative process has created limits on both property tax and
additional taxes and fees, state limits reach the extreme. Not
only do such limits make it difficult to respond to the needs
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of local residents, they often influence the behavior of resi-
dents and of the local government in negative ways.
California’s Proposition 13, adopted in 1976, limits the prop-
erty tax rate to 1 percent of assessed value and limits increas-
es in assessed value to 2 percent annually until the property
is sold, at which time it is reassessed at its market value. In
Oregon, there is competition for high-valued new home con-
struction as a way to replenish diminished public coffers.
The predictable result for residents is a slowdown in house
sales and the anomaly of neighbors paying different property
taxes despite living in identical houses. Additionally, because
local property taxes are limited but local option sales taxes
are not, critics contend that municipalities zone too much
land for big box retail in the hopes of landing a Best Buy store
and a mall-induced tax windfall. Proposition 13 has also
meant a virtual state takeover of education funding and a high
dependence on state funding for other specific purposes. As
a result, one of our interviewees in California observed, “Our
cities are terribly hamstrung by Prop 13 in a way that skews
city actions. City governments now represent a collection of
specific companies, each of which has a specific revenue
source.”
North Carolina takes a different approach to state oversight.
Its Local Government Commission (LGC) exercises oversight
over local fiscal and financial behavior. Additionally, the
commission has the authority to require municipalities
that are over budget either to reduce services or to increase
taxes to bring their budgets immediately into balance. The
commission, which came into existence in the 1930s as a
result of a series of bankruptcies by local governments in
North Carolina, must approve all bonds issued by local gov-
ernments. This is in sharp contrast to Pennsylvania, where
Pittsburgh, in severe financial trouble in 1998, issued $255
million in noncallable bonds through the Internet to cover its
growing pension obligation. The city invested the proceeds in
the stock market in time to experience the downturn in 2000.
One report notes that the city is paying nearly $17 million in
interest annually on these bonds, which adds significantly to
its operating costs.
Through annual audits, the North Carolina LGC also oversees,
although with a very light hand, the fiscal conduct of local
governments. LGC has the authority to require localities to
change their budgets through budget cuts or revenue
increases, and in extreme cases, it is authorized to take over
local governments. However, the commission rarely needs to
exercise its takeover authority because the many intermedi-
ate interactions between the LGC and local governments flag
fiscal problems and allow localities to rectify them before
they become crises. This benign protection creates a cordial
relationship with North Carolina cities. In fact, many public
officials appreciate the commission’s oversight and feel that
it contributes to good government.
Pennsylvania’s form of fiscal oversight stands in sharp con-
trast. Act 47, the state’s DistressedMunicipalities Act, comes
into play only after local governments are already in serious
trouble — as one of our Pennsylvania interviewees noted,
“after they can no longer pay their firemen and police.” In
other words, the state does not step in to help cities in dis-
tress until they are on the verge of bankruptcy and request
state help. Even then, it does not provide fiscal aid but rather
“watches cities that come under the act like a hawk” and
allows them to tax more and benefit from other non-aid
mechanisms. As one assistant to the state legislature assert-
ed, the combination of a sharp drop in a city’s credit rating and
the heavy state oversight makes the option of asking for the
application of Act 47 an extremely unattractive one for a city.
This also contrasts with the Illinois Distressed River Towns
law, which allowed certain cities to open casinos as a way of
averting serious financial hardship. The law is credited in part
with helping to keep these cities viable and turning them
around.
Competition
States should permit competition among local governments
in terms of the type, level, and quality of services they wish
to provide, the rate at which they wish to tax themselves to
provide these services, and the effectiveness and efficien-
cy of local government. However, they should not allow or
encourage local government competition through tax abate-
ments/concessions to businesses. Economies are regional
in scope. Therefore, giving local governments widespread
authority to attract economic activity through tax concessions
merely results in moving activity from one place in the
economic region to another, not in creating new economic
activity. Incentives have their strongest influence on the
locational behavior of firms within a metropolitan region. This
is because businesses make location decisions on the basis
of worker cost and quality and on access to markets, factors
that are regionwide in scope and almost always far outweigh
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property tax costs in importance. As a consequence, publicly
provided tax concessions can tip the scales in the favor of
one community within a region over another. However, from
the perspective of the region and the state, this shift in
location does not bring forth any new economic activity —
the business was going to locate in the region anyway.
Therefore the relocation simply shifts tax money among
municipalities and provides a windfall to the business. This is
bad public policy.
The exception to this rule occurs when the state has a nar-
rowly targeted incentive program that builds up the tax base
or employment base of an impoverished community.
However, experience has shown that it is extremely hard for
state legislatures to maintain narrowly targeted tax incentive
programs; in the process of building coalitions, they invariably
face pressure to widen the scope of benefits. The question
of “What’s in it for my constituents?” leads to legislative
logrolling and the distortion of (once) narrowly targeted
incentives.
Tax incentives tend to reduce themselves to one-at-a-time,
firm-specific, “let’s make a deal” business tax reform.
Indeed, the state’s tax abatement authority fosters inefficient
competition among municipalities.
Several of the states we visited had programs permitting
local governments to grant tax relief as an economic
development tool. Michigan and Pennsylvania pursue deep
abatements rather than fundamental business tax reform.
Michigan’s Renaissance Zones waive business and residen-
tial taxes for 10 to 15 years, prompting one interviewee to call
them “enterprise zones on steroids.” The state also provides
tax relief through its industrial facilities property tax abate-
ment (PA 198), personal property tax abatement (PA 328),
Neighborhood Enterprise Zones (locally initiated, provides tax
incentives for housing development and improvement), and
many other forms of tax relief. In Pennsylvania, some of the
people with whom we spoke felt that the Keystone
Opportunity Zones (areas that the community, with state
approval, designates as tax-free) had originally worked well
when they were limited and well-targeted. However,
the rapid spread of the tax abatement zones has led to a
substantial loss of tax revenue for the state and local govern-
ments without necessarily helping areas that are most in
need. It is better to restructure the tax and service environ-
ment than to engage in “let’s make a deal” tax reform.
The Principle of Choice
States should permit some degree of choice in the form of
municipal government. States either determine the form of
government that municipalities can adopt or provide a menu
fromwhich they can choose. The cities we visited had a wide
range of government forms — from mayor-council in
Chicago, San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Lansing to council-
manager in Grand Rapids, Sacramento, and Charlotte, and
the commission form in Portland. Some city councils are
elected through district or ward elections, other cities use at-
large council elections, and yet others use mixed systems.
Virtually everywhere we traveled, city officials lauded the
superiority of their system. The research literature suggests
advantages and disadvantages for each. Council-manager
systems are typically more efficient (and less prone to corrup-
tion) than mayor-council systems, but they are also less able
to focus on policy-making and less able to represent the
diverse interests in the municipality. In addition, it is difficult
to provide a transformational vision of the future and build
necessary coalitions when the chief executive of the munici-
pality is a hired professional manager rather than a politician.
At-large elections support a focus on the well-being of the
city as a whole but are likely to disenfranchise minorities and
reduce the power of neighborhoods. Ward-based elections
are more likely to give representation to minorities (if minori-
ties are concentrated, as is frequently the case, in a small
number of districts). They also better represent neighborhood
interests. At the same time, this system increases the prob-
ability of the delivery of “pork” to neighborhoods, encour-
ages NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) behavior, and makes tar-
geted transformative investments more difficult.
Given the advantages and disadvantages of ward versus at-
large systems of election (and the fact that the at-large sys-
tems are increasingly seen as violating civil rights protections
by preventing or limiting minority representation), we were
impressed by the merits of a mixed system of ward and at-
large elections, such as those that exist in Aurora, Charlotte,
Durham, Lansing, and Philadelphia. Whatever formal govern-
ing system exists, cities need to be able to pursue a common
view of what is in the city’s best interest and to protect the
interests of those who are in danger of being left behind. The
cities we visited were experiencing all sorts of transitions —
economic, ethnic, and social. Their greatest challenge was to
balance change with tradition, economic growth with eco-
nomic fairness, and political control with market control.
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The Principle of Annexation
States should make it easy for cities to annex land and dif-
ficult for areas surrounding cities to incorporate. States set
the rules of the game for annexation and municipal incorpo-
ration. Annexation gives cities the ability to grow and reduces
the flow of residents and businesses to incorporated
suburbs. It enables residents to exercise their preference for
suburban-style living while remaining within city borders.
Annexation also protects and expands the city’s tax base.
Nearly everyone we interviewed in North Carolina attributed
the success of their cities to the ease of annexation and the
difficulty of undertaking municipal incorporation to avoid
being annexed. We were told that when it comes to munici-
pal success, “annexation policy is enormous.”
Unlike most other states, North Carolina cities can annex
surrounding unincorporated territory without a vote of the
residents living in that territory. Annexation requirements
include minimum density qualifications, contiguous boundary
and land use specifications, city ability to extend services, and
unincorporated status of the territory. North Carolina
strengthens its ease-of-annexation policy with policies
that make it difficult to incorporate as a municipality. An area
seeking incorporation must be able to offer four of several
basic services (police, fire, solid waste protection, water dis-
tribution, street maintenance, street construction, street
lighting, and zoning) and to levy a property tax of at least five
mils within three years of incorporation. Furthermore, it can-
not incorporate if it is within five miles of a city of more than
50,000 without the permission of that city.
Principles to Guide State Policies
toward Cities
The Principle of Innovation
States should engage in innovation and experimentation in
the development of urban policies and should encourage
cities to experiment as well. One of the most compelling
arguments for the federal system is that the states can serve
as laboratories for experimentation or “laboratories of
democracy,” as Louis Brandeis termed them. In our research,
we found a wide range of state innovation and experimenta-
tion, some of which we have already discussed. Below we
provide a sample of these innovations:
 Oregon and Washington have growth management
boundaries. Oregon’s land use act requires all cities and
counties to develop a comprehensive plan for complying
with the act’s planning goals. The plan is then subject to
a formal approval process. All land within the state’s
Urban Growth Boundaries (UGB) must be rezoned to
accommodate high-density development, and the UGB
must include enough land to absorb 20 years of popula-
tion and job growth. Washington’s law differs from
Oregon’s in that not all of its local governments are
required to submit growth management plans; local
plans do not have to be formally approved unless they are
challenged. In addition, Washington’s sanctions of locali-
ties that fail to comply with the Growth Management Act
are significantly less onerous than Oregon’s.
 Oregon’s Transportation Planning Rule, first adopted in
1991, aims to reduce auto dependency by requiring all
local governments to reduce vehicle miles traveled per
capita (VMT) by a predetermined percent. Each locality is
required to have a specified transportation plan to reduce
VMT and to encourage mass transit, bicycle, and pedes-
trian travel. The state’s transportation department
supports these plans through its transportation invest-
ment programs, using a combination of federal funds,
state gas tax revenue, and license tag fees.
 Oregon’s Metro Government for the Portland area, which
is the only elected general regional governing body in the
country, is an elected regional government, with limited,
but important, powers
 California requires each local government to include in its
general plan an explanation of how it will meet its hous-
ing goals. The Housing and Community Development
Department assigns regional housing goals based on
population projections from the state Department of
Finance. The regional council of governments then trans-
lates these regionwide goals into allocations for each
jurisdiction. The goals address all income levels: very low
(0 to 50 percent of the area median income), low (50 to
80 percent), moderate (80 to 120 percent), and above
moderate (120 percent and higher). The housing plan
does not require new housing construction; instead, it
requires the jurisdiction to ensure that such housing
could be built, addressing such issues as zoning and land-
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use controls, building codes, developer fees, and permit
procedures. Because there is no construction require-
ment, the plan has been more exhortatory than binding,
although it has also given localities that wish to build
affordable housing a political rationale for doing so.
 Michigan, which created a state land bank authority
in 2003, authorizes local land bank authorities to help
governments assemble and clear title to properties for
economic development. This program is viewed as a
development and land-use planning tool; it allows land
bank authorities to obtain title to vacant or abandoned
properties through an improved tax reversion process,
clear title to these properties, assemble parcels, and pro-
vide them to nonprofit and other developers for commu-
nity development.
 Washington mandates the use of 80 percent of its federal
private activity tax exempt bond cap for low-income
housing. This is an unusual use of the bond cap, which
most states use for capital and infrastructure improve-
ments.
 California, like most states, authorizes tax increment
financing (TIF) as a tool for economic development. The
increase in property tax revenue resulting from the new
development in the TIF-designated area is set aside to
finance development. However, California requires rede-
velopment authorities that use tax increment financing
to set aside (although not necessarily to use) 20 percent
of the increased revenue for affordable housing.
Redevelopment authorities are responsible for the con-
struction or rehabilitation of more than 63,000 units of
affordable housing since 1994, making them the state’s
second-largest funder of affordable housing in California
after the federal government.
 North Carolina is at the national forefront in the develop-
ment of pre-kindergarten programs for its children. In
1996, Governor Jim Hunt initiated Smart Start to provide
a variety of supports to children. This flexible program
serves locally determined priorities. While generally tar-
geted toward children of lower-income families, Smart
Start also supports capacity and quality improvements in
child care and other areas that might be accessible to
higher-income parents. County Smart Start advisory pan-
els, made up of educators, mental health experts, and
others determine the investments that need to be made.
Nonprofit partnerships for children, working with the local
Smart Start board, distribute money for appropriate
needs. Funded activities include health screenings for
children and tuition reimbursement for accreditation
classes for childcare providers. The program is adminis-
tered through local Smart Start boards, which also have
501(c) (3) status. Governor Michael Easley, with the sup-
port of the Department of Health and Human Services
and the Department of Education, subsequently imple-
mented “More at Four,” an innovative program for at-risk
children.
 Michigan has devised a system of public school choice
that gives a student the right to leave the school system
in which he or she lives to attend school in another dis-
trict, should the receiving district agree to participate in
the program. The incentive for participation is that the
receiving district receives the full state foundation grant
for that child. Because Michigan, unlike other states,
finances its local school systems primarily from the state
sales tax on an equalized basis, and because local dis-
tricts are effectively prohibited from increasing funding
for education out of their own property tax base, the
incentive of receiving full state aid for an additional student
is substantial. The per-pupil state aid is likely to far exceed
the cost of actually educating an additional student.
 Pennsylvania has set up community action teams (CATs)
to help cities access state development programs by
pulling together state funds and assistance from a variety
of sources across state government. The state helps
assemble teams from different agencies who work jointly
to create a rehabilitation package for older communities
that includes housing, community and economic devel-
opment, and transportation.
 Illinois subsidizes employers, who in turn subsidize their
employees’ purchase of homes near where they work.
The idea is to reduce the spatial mismatch between jobs
and housing and to ensure that housing near work is at
least relatively affordable. The Illinois Employer Assisted
Housing Program is a public-private venture. It grew out
of a pilot program initiated by the Metropolitan Planning
Council in which about 25 employers were encouraged
to participate without state incentives but with the
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motivation of reduced employee attrition and increased
worker satisfaction and productivity. The state then
“adopted” the program and turned it into REACH Illinois,
providing both tax credits and matching grants to partici-
pating employers. The formula for state funding requires
an 80 percent of area median income cap for a matching
grant and 120 percent for tax credits. There is no
specific distance-from-work requirement, but the
employer-developed plan must address the transporta-
tion issue in order to quality for state assistance.6
 Pennsylvania, recognizing that refurbishing the down-
town core alone will not produce results, has begun to
urge cities to combine business with residential develop-
ment. The state’s Elm Street initiative, which focuses on
residential areas that surround a city’s historic center,
complements its Main Street initiative, which focuses on
the business district.
The Principles of Scale and Meaning
State policies towards cities should be strategic and
focused. In some states, urban policy is little more than a
collection of small, poorly funded programs that, in many
cases, seems to have been designed more for credit-claim-
ing purposes than for impact. They are too small, scattered,
or ineffective to change the path of city development.
Michigan and Pennsylvania, with their patronage, pork-bar-
rel political heritages, are both subject to this tendency. For
example, Pennsylvania’s Keystone Innovation Zones (KIZ)
program targets funds to companies through five-year
grants. In its current incarnation, the program’s three-year
fund of $10 million has 15 KIZ recipients. While $10 million
would appear to be serious money, the average KIZ
receives only $222,000 per year. This is insufficient to
change the long-term operating cost structure of a business
or to significantly write down the cost of land assembly.
Michigan’s “Cool Cities” program suggests similar prob-
lems. Funded at $1 million, it provides cities with grants of
$100,000 that are intended to be catalytic, bringing commu-
nities together and helping them develop a transformative
vision of the future. While the program has been well-
received by grant recipients, the transformative benefit of
the program is open to question.
The Reinvestment Fund, which authored a comprehensive
study of Pennsylvania’s housing investment programs in
2004, issued a stinging assessment that seems to character-
ize many of the state’s development programs in other areas
as well:
“[F]unding decisions are made at the state and
local levels, not by evaluating the impact of an
investment and its ability to move a market or
meet a strategic need, but by:
 regulations that guide a program
 political interest and the ability of select
communities to get things done
 state response to developer interest;
developer connections
 ability to create any development within
the confines of local zoning regulations
“Most of the programs do not distribute enough
money to any one deal to enable it to simply hap-
pen. Most require so much leverage of other
resources that the funding system acts as a
deterrent to interested developers or uninten-
tionally precludes certain development.”7
In other cases, states and their cities appear to be suscepti-
ble to the fad of the year without any real attempt to think
carefully about whether it will work. Several of our cities, fre-
quently with state encouragement, seem to be engaged in an
effort to create city success by following Richard Florida’s
prescription to attract the “creative class.” We think this
misses Florida’s point. The lesson from Richard Florida’s
research is not to seek a particular class of person but to try
to develop a city that has distinctive and desirable character-
istics, something that distinguishes it from other cities. In so
doing, it attracts other individuals who value that same
distinctiveness, creating yet additional support for that
uniqueness.
Portland, for example, has done this. The physical, political,
and cultural attributes of the city serve to attract young, cre-
ative, entrepreneurial, well-educated residents who wish
to live in an urban environment but also value proximity
to environmental and natural resources or, as one of our
interviewees put it, “white people voting blue.” Path depend-
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ency, or the presence of other young, creative, liberal people,
supports this culture by attracting similar in-migrants to the
region. In addition, the region’s unique land use and
transportation planning system, aggressive downtown revi-
talization efforts, and environmentally conscious policies both
embody and reinforce Portland’s distinctive culture.
Some cities are still seeking a silver bullet to their economic
woes through construction of projects such as downtown
convention centers, without any sense that there is a limited
demand for conventions and without understanding that if
every city has a convention center, many will not experience
beneficial effects. The point is not to drag out the usual list of
misfired silver bullets — waterfront festival malls, aquariums,
convention centers, sports stadiums — simply because in
some places they have worked. The point is that an invest-
ment should be chosen in light of an identifiable market or a
credible theory of change. Mayor Daley told a meeting of
CEOs for cities that it is important for cities to “imitate [good
ideas] without copying.” If all you do is copy, distinctiveness
is lost.
The Principle of Appropriateness: Part 1
Redistributive policies are more appropriately a state gov-
ernment function than a local government function. Cities
find it difficult to engage in redistributive tax policies because
the taxpayers who provide the funds for redistribution can eas-
ily escape those taxes by moving across city boundaries to
suburban jurisdictions. Redistributive policies are better
lodged at the state level, since escape from the state is more
difficult and less likely. Some large central cities have func-
tions and responsibilities that are vestiges of the late 1800s
and early 1900s, when they were the exclusive centers of
wealth in a state and assumed responsibilities that are appro-
priately those of the state. Court systems, penal systems,
hospital networks, and city-owned colleges are useful
sources of patronage, but they increase local tax burdens,
lower the quality of services delivered, and therefore can con-
tribute to the loss of the middle-class taxpayers. Returning
traditional state functions to the state gets the city out of
another set of redistributive politics. Vestiges of the domi-
nance cities once enjoyed are found in the prohibitions that
prevent cities from benefiting from state motor fuel gas col-
lections in Ohio and Missouri.
The Principle of Appropriateness: Part 2
States should encourage problem solving at the regional
level for problems that affect the entire region or have
spillover effects from one jurisdiction to others. The
American system of urban government is the most
fragmented among developed nations.
Fragmentation brings with it both advantages and disadvan-
tages. The advantages are that it affords area residents
substantial choice in terms of the kind of community in which
they wish to reside. Residents, for example, can choose
among various tax and service packages. Many small com-
munities also foster a stronger sense of place, a greater
opportunity for political participation, and a greater potential
for holding government accountable.
But there are disadvantages as well. Fragmentation makes it
difficult to pursue policies that benefit the region as a whole.
Coordination across local boundaries requires substantial
effort, and economies of scale for capital-intensive activities
usually require the creation of a regional single-purpose spe-
cial district. A Pennsylvania official explains: “Pennsylvania
has a fundamental structural problem: [there is … simply
such a huge number of governments. The state is expected
to help them all do things, but the state doesn’t have as much
control as it would like, especially with land control
decisions.”
Without a system of state equalization grants such as we
recommend below (or without effective regional tax-sharing,
which exists in only a few U.S. metropolitan areas), local
governments within a metropolitan area are likely to compete
with one another for local tax base. Local government com-
petition for tax ratables is a zero sum game that does not
result in benefits to the region, although it may benefit one
jurisdiction within the region at the expense of others. In
most areas, the competition is over the location of high-value
property (which yields more in revenues than it costs to serv-
ice). However, in California, Proposition 13 imposes severe
limits on the taxation of existing property. As a result, the
competition is either over the location of new ratables or,
since a portion of the state sales tax is still available to local
governments on a point-of-origin basis, the location of retail
stores that either sell in high volumes or sell high-priced
goods (such as power centers anchored by big box stores or
auto malls). This competition over the local tax base drives
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land use policy in California (which has been termed “the
fiscalization of land use policy”) and makes it difficult to con-
struct and implement a region-wide growth management
strategy.
Given this localism, state governments should encourage
cooperative activity on an intergovernmental and regional
basis. Widespread acceptance of full-scale regional govern-
ments has not proved politically feasible in the American
context and, given the benefits of large numbers of local gov-
ernments, may not even be desirable. However, options that
stop short of creating a single metropolitan government are
available.
As noted above, the Oregon state legislature created
Portland Metro, which is responsible for regional land use
planning in the Portland metropolitan region. Metro also plans
for activities of regional importance, including the operation of
regional facilities (such as the Oregon Zoo and the
Convention Center), transportation, parks and open spaces,
water quality, air quality, solid waste disposal, and the devel-
opment and dissemination of data. The agency has jurisdic-
tion over the 25 cities and parts of three counties that are in
the Oregon portion of the Portland region. Metro is governed
by the Metro Council, which is composed of a council presi-
dent who is elected regionwide and six councilors elected by
district. To date, Metro is the only directly elected regional
planning organization in the United States.
Both Oregon and Washington have passed legislation, with
the support of their largest cities (Portland and Seattle), that
establishes a growth management boundary around these
cities’ regions. In both cases, the growth management
boundary is designed to channel growth to the high-density
regional core around a functioning downtown. This mandated
growth at the regional core preserves land on the periphery
and reduces the amount of tax base siphoned to competition
among peripheral exurban communities.
States with more traditional political cultures have adopted
less radical, but still region-based, measures. Pennsylvania,
with its political culture of localism and with coordination
problems because of its unusually large number of local
governments, has recently begun seeking voluntary mecha-
nisms for regional cooperation. In June 2000, it amended the
Municipalities Planning Code, adding an article that permits
multiple governments to organize and plan together.
Jurisdictions that do so gain preferential treatment in obtain-
ing state planning funds and funds for the adoption and
implementation of regional activity. Regional activity author-
ized for participating municipalities under the act includes the
sharing of tax revenues and fees among municipalities in the
region, the power to adopt a transfer of development rights,
and the authority to adopt a countywide or multimunicipal
comprehensive plan for any commercial and industrial part of
the area covered by the plan
In Michigan, where local government incorporation has left
major cities landlocked, the state permits cooperative condi-
tional land transfers through PA 425, enacted in 1984.
Referred to as “contractual annexation,” a 425 agreement
between two jurisdictions provides for sharing property tax
revenues generated by a conditional land transfer. The agree-
ment must state which jurisdiction will own the property at
the end of the contract period, which cannot exceed 50
years. These agreements, which are available to any city,
village, or township, are commonly used when a local jurisdic-
tion does not have adequate land or infrastructure for a
business that wants to locate or expand. Structured as a con-
ditional land transfer, the property is treated as if it belongs to
the receiving jurisdiction. These agreements have been used
by dozens of towns and cities, including Lansing, which
entered into an agreement with the town of Delta when
General Motors wanted to construct a new plant and Lansing
did not have sufficient land. Delta had the land required to
house the new plant, and Lansing had both the infrastructure
to accommodate the new plant and the ability to offer a tax
incentive that Delta could not. Lansing and Delta shared in
the revenues from the development.
Other states have similar devices, such as Ohio’s joint
economic development districts, in which local governments
can trade tax revenues for infrastructure extensions as an
economic development alternative to annexation.
The Principle of Complexity
States and local urban governments should be alert to the
complexity of policies affecting urban areas and the power-
ful impact of secondary effects and unintended conse-
quences. Public policies frequently come tied together
in complex packages that have diverse effects, some
desirable, others not; some widely acknowledged, others
heatedly contested. Oregon’s statewide land use planning
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program is a classic example. The program’s primary goal —
to channel growth and development within the boundary
while preserving farmland and open space — has clearly
been met. In the process, it has helped make Portland’s
urban area distinctive and has attracted in-migrants who are
drawn to a highly urbanized and mass transit-oriented
lifestyle.
At the same time, by the inexorable law of supply and
demand, the growth boundary has raised the price of land. In
response, developers have built housing on smaller lots,
emphasizing multifamily units and townhouses rather than
traditional suburban development with single-family houses
and large yards. As a consequence, households who prefer
traditional suburban development must either pay a very high
premium for it or look elsewhere. Thus the Urban Growth
Boundary has limited residential choice. Whether this is the
result of building more housing units on smaller plots of land
that are more expensive per acre or the result of per-unit
housing costs is unclear. It is clear that a standardized unit of
housing is now more expensive than it would be were there
no growth boundary. In addition, land owners outside the
growth boundary have lost the development value of their
land, a loss that has been recognized in a recently passed
statewide initiative petition and successfully defended before
the state Supreme Court. The state legislature has instigated
a multiyear review of Oregon’s land use planning system by
an external panel in what has become known as “The Big
Look.”
Principles to Guide State Policy on
Grants to Cities and Local
Governments
The Principle of Equalization
States should provide an equalization grant to local govern-
ments to compensate for differences in local tax capacities.
Local governments, even when they levy the same tax rate
on their residents, differ in their ability to provide services.
This results from the fact that the same tax rate may gener-
ate differing amounts of revenue because of differences in
community tax bases. Some local governments, for exam-
ple, have a high property tax base per capita, while others,
particularly poorer communities, have a much lower
per capita property tax base. Cities are not always deprived
with respect to tax capacity; some cities have higher
tax capacity than the state average, and in many states,
rural or natural resource-dependent regions are at a particular
disadvantage.
However, communities should not be penalized because of
poor tax capacity. Nearly all states have an equalization com-
ponent in their education finance system, but few have an
equalizing mechanism for noneducation purposes. An equal-
ization program would put all communities on a more equal
basis in the delivery of essential services.
In the extreme case of full equalization, each jurisdiction
would receive, through its own sources and through a state
equalization grant, the same amount as all other jurisdictions
for a given tax rate levied. Thus, some jurisdictions might
prefer to tax themselves at 3 percent of property tax value
and others at 5 percent; but all cities taxing themselves at
three percent would generate the same revenue, while cities
taxing themselves at 5 percent would generate more rev-
enue. This redistribution would not inevitably and always help
cities. In many states, the beneficiaries would be rural areas
with low property values and low tax capacity.
Local governments frequently complain that they are not
receiving their fair share of state government aid, sometimes
citing per capita aid figures to support their argument.
However, overall calculations of state aid per capita are not a
good measure of the way in which the state government is
treating cities. What is a “fair share” will differ according to
the purpose of the state activity and, on a program-by-
program basis, cities will not always receive above-average
amounts of state aid. To take an extreme example, it is obvi-
ous that state aid for agriculture will go disproportionately to
rural communities. Indeed, as already noted, economically
vital cities should be exporters of state aid. Of the cities we
visited, data from the Census of Government Finances for
2001-2002 show that only Grand Rapids and Lansing
received less state aid per capita than the average for the
state, while Portland and Tacoma received approximately the
same amounts as the average. All of the other cities received
more per capita aid than the average municipality in their
state.
The Principle of General Support
Some states provide general support to local governments
through revenue sharing, shared taxes, and/or block rather
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than categorical grants, to enable cities to make decisions
based on their own priorities. These types of grants frequent-
ly are allocated on at least a partial equalization basis.
However, general support programs have been cut back in
many states over the past decade. Michigan has had a state
revenue-sharing program for many years, but it has been
severely eroded by budget cuts. Other states also operate
local government funds that provide general support. Ohio
has a Local Government Fund (LGF) with dedicated funding
sources and a minimum share of the state budget that is to
be deposited into the fund. However, in FY 2004, the legisla-
ture, anticipating a decline in state revenues, tried to divert
LGF funds to the state’s general revenue fund in response to
the continued fall in anticipated state tax revenue.
There is no easy response to a widespread tax revolt among
voters. The answers lie in tying together several of the princi-
ples we have outlined: looking at the state-local fiscal system
as a unified whole; guarding against overdependence on a
single, cyclically sensitive tax source; providing the state
oversight necessary to ensure fiscal responsibility; and mov-
ing redistributive functions of government to the state and
away from cities.
The Impact of State Policy on the
Political Climate
States with Stable Policy EnvironmentsWill
Reap Benefits
It is difficult for cities to pursue a successful vision or to
project stability if they must contend with frequent, unantici-
pated, and often dramatic discontinuities in state policy.
Nobody would reasonably argue that partisan changes in
state control should not occur or that they should not be
accompanied by policy changes (or, indeed, that policy
changes should not occur even without changes in partisan
control). It is also impossible to defend ineffective programs
and spending. And it is difficult to make investments —
whether public or private — when the fiscal environment is
unpredictable. That said, there are several forms of instability
that hurt the ability of cities to contribute to the economic and
social development of the state.
We observed in some of our case studies that changes in
state government control (sometimes even if they did not
reflect partisan changes) were accompanied by sweeping
changes in policies and programs that reflected an attitude of,
“Let’s put our stamp on state government and get rid of or
eviscerate the signature programs of the previous administra-
tion,” even if the previous programs were operating success-
fully. This leads to an additional principle for managing state-
local relationships.
New state administrations should evaluate the effective-
ness of existing state programs affecting cities, retaining
and improving those that are working, irrespective of their
association with the policies of the previous administration.
A prime example is Pennsylvania’s Ben Franklin Innovation
Partnership Program, which was the pride of then-Governor
Richard Thornburgh’s economic development program and
received national acclaim during the 1980s. The program
was dramatically downgraded by the succeeding Casey
Administration, which launched Industrial Resource Centers
(IRCs). The IRCs were supposedly a response to the feder-
al government’s Manufacturing Extension Partnership and
the state’s need to address problems in its existing manu-
facturing base. But the switch from the Ben Franklin
Partnership to the IRC program reflects not the relative
merit of one program versus the other but the state’s ten-
dency to reflexively change policies as administrations
change. As one person commented, “The Ben Franklins,
initially the leading edge for technology in Pennsylvania,
became invisible.” While the program continues to exist,
those we interviewed in Pennsylvania mentioned it merely
as an afterthought. Businesses like predictability, so this
type of policy instability hurts economic development.
Charlotte stands in stark contrast. The city has maintained a
predictable policy record over time, with the explicit goal of
reducing uncertainty in order to increase entrepreneurial
investment in communities. Indeed, several interviewees
pointed to this strategy as an important element in the city’s
successful redevelopment. They asserted that “the business
of Charlotte is business.”
Tax and expenditure limits and term limits are introducing
instability into the management and governance of cities.
The initiative and referendum process, which played a major
role in three of our states —- California, Oregon, and
Washington —- and a moderate role in Michigan, is another
generator of sharp and unexpected discontinuities.
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California’s series of reactions to Proposition 13 and its
effects serve as a good example of fiscal instability, which
we have termed “mandated public policy incoherence.”
California’s state-local fiscal system is a virtual casebook on
how local governments can become hostages to changes
they cannot control. The 1976 passage of Proposition 13 was
followed in 1979 by AB 8, in which the state tried to bail out
the local jurisdictions by shifting a portion of the property
taxes back to them and using general fund revenues to pay
for education. Proposition 98, approved by voters in 1988,
mandated a level of education funding, requiring the state to
use general fund revenues to close any gap between the
obligatory funding and locally generated property taxes.
Property taxes were again shifted from cities to the schools
in 1992 and 1993, when the state faced budget gaps of $4
billion to $14 billion. To provide some relief to local jurisdic-
tions, in 1993 the state approved Proposition 172, which,
among other things, imposed a one-half cent sales tax with
revenue dedicated to local public safety. As cities, counties,
and special districts tried to adjust to declining property
tax revenues by imposing other property-related fees, the
voters passed Proposition 218 in 1996, requiring voter
approval for most property-related taxes and charges. As a
city representative explained, “We can handle reduction but
not uncertainty.”
Another source of instability is legislative term limits, which
contribute to policy instability through the frequent turnover
of legislators and their staffs, the consequent decline in
expertise, the increased difficulty in building legislative coali-
tions across geographic and party divides, and the emphasis
on gaining recognition for legislative initiatives as a means of
positioning legislators to run for the next office. These prob-
lems are well recognized in California, Michigan, and Oregon
among the political class, as is the shift in expertise from the
legislature to the executive branch and to lobbyists. However,
it is not well-recognized by voters.8
Another example of state-induced instability in the local
government policy environment is the frequent resort to
cutbacks in state fiscal aid during times of state fiscal difficul-
ties. For example, as a response to state fiscal problems,
Michigan has cut back on the state revenue-sharing program
to local governments. Lansing received $20 million from the
state in 1998 and 1999, with an increase to $22 million in
2001, but a steady decrease since then, with revenues dip-
ping below $18 million in 2005.
For several years in the early 1990s, North Carolina failed to
distribute the local share of the state utility tax because of a
state budget crisis. This failure to share revenue produced a
strong negative reaction from local governments, which lob-
bied to get it reinstated. Many of those we interviewed in
North Carolina cited this incident as proof that state govern-
ment was “constantly nibbling away at cities.” California’s
jurisdictions experienced a similar withdrawal of revenues
when the state reduced the vehicle license fee and promised
to backfill lost revenues. When the state was unable to make
good on this promise, it deferred the backfill payment to
2006.
States that Address Problems on the HorizonWill
Succeed
There is an understandable human tendency to deal with
problems that are present and to put aside those that will not
arrive in full fury for some time. However understandable,
states and cities must prepare for known contingencies that
will affect them in the future. Three of these kinds of prob-
lems appear in one or more of our case study sites:
Unfunded pension liabilities are facing cities we visit-
ed in Oregon, Illinois, and Pennsylvania9 and, indeed,
are a problem nationwide.
Too many state and local governments followed the lead of
private pension funds in the late 1990s, booking paper cap-
ital gains in their retirement portfolios as real income gains
and cutting back their payments to public retirement plans.
The bursting of the tech stock bubble, the slowing of the
Initial Public Offering (IPO) market, and the recession of
2001 have had a lasting effect on the equities market.
Making money through venture capital investments ended
up being difficult, and many public plans are now severely
underfunded.
Indeed, the National Association of State Retirement
Administrators (NASRA) reported in December 2005 that
almost one-third of all public pension funds are underfunded,
a finding that Standard and Poor’s replicated.10 S&P found that
state pension funds were underfunded by $284 billion in
2004 and had a funded ratio of 84 percent, which can dimin-
ish the creditworthiness and borrowing capacity of state and
local governments. Funded ratios ranged fromWest Virginia’s
43.9 percent to North Carolina’s 108.1 percent.11 However,
the S&P results do not include independent city, county, and
independent school system plans. In the case of Illinois, for
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example, the state system is in crisis while the Chicago
teachers’ retirement plan is reported to be in good shape. In
Oregon, the problem resides in the teacher’s retirement plan.
In October 2005, Wilshire Consulting reported on the per-
formance of city and county retirement funds, using a mix of
2003 and 2004 data.12 Wilshire reported on 104 systems,
with some cities and counties having multiple systems.
Funding ratios are reported for some of our study cities:
 Chicago municipal workers, 70.9 percent; firefighters,
44.1 percent; police, 55.0 percent; teachers, 84.6 percent
 Grand Rapids municipal workers, 99.7 percent; police
and fire, 113.4 percent
 Philadelphia municipal workers, 58.8 percent
 Sacramento City,108.4 percent; county, 78.8 percent
 Seattle City, 107.0 percent
 Tacoma municipal, 118.0 percent
Major increases in immigration combined with new set-
tlement patterns create problems.
Aurora, Chicago, Portland, and Seattle share a common immi-
grant problem. New, lower-skilled foreign immigrants are
bypassing expensive central city housing markets and mov-
ing directly into lower-priced housing units in unincorporated
suburban areas or into low-value residential suburbs of the
core city. The motivation is clear: access to suburban service
sector work, shorter commutes, and cheaper housing.
However, they are moving into areas without the dense net-
work of social service supports that exist in the city, and their
children are typically in financially strapped school districts.
Recent mandates from the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) will place substantial
new fiscal burdens on cities.
These mandates include:
 Requirements for the separation of storm water from
waste water
 Control of surface water runoff
 Increases in water quality standards
The EPA is mandating that cities and counties comply with
stricter clean water standards, requiring them to complete
huge new infrastructure projects within 20 years at a time
when there is no federal assistance and states are contend-
ing with water quality issues in rural areas as well. Combining
these unfunded federal mandates with an increasingly uncer-
tain fiscal environment in which the initiative process may be
used to impose tax and expenditure limits could impact the
borrowing ability of both states and cities unless there is fore-
sight and a coordinated response.
States with Outmoded Political Cultures Will
Fall Behind
States and cities develop cultures over time, a way of doing
business that may have an important impact on their
performance. In the political sphere, cities that have
incorporated into their routine behavior expectations of clean
government, transparency, flexibility, and an emphasis on
service delivery are more likely to succeed than those that
continue to emphasize patronage and pork as the primary
output of government, cast a blind eye on government cor-
ruption and payoffs, and are encased in sclerotic administra-
tive structures. Similarly, cities (and states) where the politi-
cal culture values problem solving and cooperation rather
than confrontation and partisanship are more likely to have
high-performing state and municipal governments. In the
economic sphere, states and cities that have traditionally
been major industrial producers developed entitlement men-
talities and a veneration of the status quo rather than an
appreciation of entrepreneurship and a desire for innovation
and change. In places that were doing well, we saw perform-
ance politics trumping old-style patronage politics (or at least
holding even), and cooperation besting entrenched hierarchy.
Pennsylvania offers an example of a state with a culture that
can be detrimental to cities. With the second-largest legisla-
ture in terms of the number of members (253) and the largest
number of members per 100,000 residents among the
nation’s largest 11 states,13 Pennsylvania is viewed as focus-
ing on “distributional issues rather than generation issues.”
Pennsylvania has been described as maintaining its industrial-
age mindset. When considering regeneration of the
Monongahela River Valley, formerly dominated by steel mills,
the state offered programs to increase industrial activity
rather than accommodating the community’s desire to use its
resources to reconnect with the river. As a former local offi-
cial explained, “Pennsylvania is still doing business the old
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fashioned way and it’s hurting us. … We have important
assets — access to national markets, airport, cultural institu-
tions, and universities … Unless we begin to change the
government structure, taxes, and labor laws and break the
hold of labor [on the state government], we won’t be compet-
itive and the window to change is getting short.”
State Policies Directly Affecting Cities
In the following sections we focus on what we have learned
about state activities in specific policy areas that are
important to cities. When relevant, we will also discuss city
activities that are related to state policies or laws. Based on
our research, we have set forth in the first part of this docu-
ment a variety of generalizations (which we have termed prin-
ciples) about the kinds of approaches that are more likely to
be successful and the kinds that are less likely to be so.
During our case study visits, we also came across a substan-
tial number of specific state and city programs that seemed
consistent with these principles, and it is to these that we
turn in this section. We note, however, that our study did not
include outcome or impact evaluations of these programs.
Nor, in most cases, could we find assessments made by oth-
ers. Consequently, when we discuss specific programs or
activities, we do so because they seem to be interesting pro-
grams consistent with our principles, not because they have
proved effective.
Housing and Housing Affordability
Housing policy affects city residents’ lives and community
well-being in various ways; indeed, it is closely linked to deci-
sions about land use/planning, transportation, infrastructure,
and schools. Many amenities of city life are capitalized in
housing prices, making them rough proxies for the general
health of local communities.
From the perspective of cities and other communities in met-
ropolitan areas, the most important housing problem is
affordability. We note, however, that the problem presents
itself in two different ways. In cities with low-performing
economies, such as Pittsburgh and Lansing, the housing
affordability problem is an offshoot of poverty problems. Low
incomes make modest rent levels unaffordable. These cities
have disproportionately large shares of their population pay-
ing more than 50 percent of their incomes on housing.
However, in cities with vibrant economies, such as San
Francisco, Portland, and Seattle, housing affordability prob-
lems result from the cost of housing itself. In these cities we
found that an unusually large proportion of households pay
between 30 and 50 percent of their incomes for housing. This
is the case in many of the West Coast cities we visited.
When the housing affordability problem lies in the demand
side of the market (lack of effective buying power), the hous-
ing problem is concentrated among low-income households.
When the cause of the problem lies in the supply side of the
market — the cost of providing housing, as is true in San
Francisco, Portland, and Seattle — affordability is a problem
not only for low-income households but also for families
securely into the middle class. In theory, the housing afford-
ability problem could be addressed through either demand- or
supply-side interventions. However, it is reasonably clear that
when the affordability problem hits households approaching
middle-class incomes, solutions to the problem lie more on
the supply side, while solutions to the problem of affordabili-
ty for lower-income households lie on the demand side.
Demand-side housing programs (i.e., programs to subsidize
the income of households through housing vouchers or
through federal subsidies sent directly to landlords to pay a
portion of the household’s rent) have been almost exclusive-
ly the province of the federal government because of their
high cost. While there is no reason that state demand-side
programs would not work — and, indeed, a few states do
have such programs — the most common state approaches
have been through supply-side measures and exhortations to
plan for affordable housing.
The most common supply-side approach is to increase hous-
ing production by issuing housing bonds, which reduce the
developer’s cost by providing tax-exempt financing or low-
interest loans. California, for example, issued a $2.1 billion
bond in 2002 that included grants to local governments to
provide down payment assistance and loans to developers of
affordable multifamily housing. Many states also have state
housing finance agencies that administer housing trust funds
that are capitalized through a variety of sources, including tax-
exempt borrowings. These trusts provide funds to develop-
ers, nonprofit organizations, and public authorities in the form
of low-interest loans and small grants. Frequently these
funds have provided gap financing.
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States take different approaches to housing finance. In most
states priority goes to low-income housing in mixed-
income neighborhoods or developments. In those cases,
local governments supplement state funding with a mixture
of federal low-income tax credits, Community Reinvestment
Act finance pools, tax increment financing, and tax abate-
ment. Some states and localities follow the example of
Montgomery County, Maryland, where development density
bonuses are granted to developers for units set aside for pub-
licly owned housing and affordable units. We were
impressed by the commitment and creativity of many of
these entities. We also must note, however, the relatively
small number of additional units that result from these
efforts.
States should try to bring down the supply-side cost
of housing through efforts to reduce the cost of union-
ized labor and minimize excessive impact fees.
The cost of housing reflects more than simply the cost of the
raw materials and labor. A study by The Reinvestment Fund
of Philadelphia observed that, “The cost of construction in
the Commonwealth’s urban centers is a barrier to increasing
development in these areas. Some of the increased cost is
the result of union work rules.”14
In San Francisco, housing supply is limited by lack of land
combined with high impact fees assessed by the city and a
burdensome and uncertain approval process, including envi-
ronment impact assessments required by state law. The
combination results in situations where, according to a
California housing consultant, “a few win, some lose, and
consultants thrive.” As a University of California economist
noted, “Housing is affordable despite the policies of the
state.”
State and city governments must be cognizant of and
attempt to moderate the housing cost consequences
of growth management efforts, rent control, and other
efforts to limit development.
It is not unusual for public policies, desirable for some ends,
to have undesirable consequences for other ends. And poli-
cy-makers must recognize this fact. Although the debate has
raged for years, it is incontrovertible that when supply is
restricted, prices will rise, unless some offsetting efforts are
taken. Thus, Portland’s Urban Growth Boundary has
increased the price of land per acre compared with what it
otherwise would have been. Developers have responded (as
the proponents of the growth control boundaries wished) by
increasing density (more multifamily units, more townhous-
es, fewer single family homes with yards) so that more
housing is located on the same amount of land. As a result,
housing prices per unit have not increased as much as they
otherwise would have, although the price of a standardized
housing unit certainly has increased, and choice has been
restricted.
Similarly, rent control, while it has held down rents on con-
trolled units, has reduced the construction of new units and
raised the price of non-controlled units. Rent control has also
had a number of secondary impacts on the housing market.
First, it discourages maintenance as landlords try to minimize
their costs. Second, lack of investment in properties will have
a negative affect on surrounding properties and neighbor-
hoods. Third, rent control has a negative impact on multifamily
housing investment because of fears that price controls will
someday be expanded to cover newer units. Finally, because
controls are frequently lifted on the unit when existing ten-
ants move, rent control encourages landlords to speed up
turnover among tenants. At the same time, it also provides
renters with a disincentive to move. In sum, rent control is a
good deal if you occupy one of the controlled units, while it
makes life more difficult for those who are not housed, own
the property, or live in the surrounding neighborhood.
In San Francisco, 65 percent of the residents are renters, and
70 percent of the renters live in rent-controlled units, so 45.5
percent of the city’s population lives in rent- controlled units.
The state interceded in the city’s rent control program in
1979, prohibiting rent controls on buildings constructed after
June 1979. While many people continue to support rent con-
trol, others we spoke with called it “vacancy decontrol.” That
is, units come out from under rent control once the unit is
vacated, and rents can then drift up to meet market levels.
Some noted that rent control does not keep prices down,
because it is effective only for long-term residents, and San
Francisco has a transient population.
States should encourage effective housing market
intermediaries by offering technical and operating
assistance.
One of the obstacles to increasing the affordable housing
supply for low-income households appears to be the
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inadequate capacity of nonprofit housing developers and
community development corporations (CDCs). In areas that
are producing a relatively large amount of affordable housing,
such as Charlotte, Grand Rapids, San Francisco, and Seattle,
interviewees stressed the importance of the competence
and sophistication of the local CDCs. Deep knowledge of
housing programs, real estate finance, and the ways of city
hall make local CDCs important players in providing decent
housing for low- and moderate-income households. In other
areas, housing and community development officials cite the
lack of capacity of these intermediary organizations as one of
the barriers to effective affordable housing policy. Some
states, such as Michigan, have a program of technical assis-
tance for nonprofit housing developers.
Some states have approached the affordable housing prob-
lem through their planning system and inclusionary zoning
requirements. We discussed earlier California’s requirement
that all local governments include a housing element in their
general plans. The housing element consists of a five-year
plan that sets forth how the jurisdiction will provide housing
for all income groups, including low-income households. The
units of housing required, divided by income strata, are allo-
cated to local governments through their councils of govern-
ments (COGs), which receive a regional allocation from the
California Department of Housing and Community
Development. However, there is no legal requirement that
local governments actually implement the plan, so that it is,
at best, exhortatory. While one interviewee asserted that the
housing element “employs attorneys and planners, but does-
n’t get units built,” another suggested that at a minimum, it
resulted in a discussion about affordable housing in each
jurisdiction. (Although as one interviewee pointed out to us, it
does provide a cover for local governments that want to
“do the right thing” because it allows elected officials to
blame the state and claim that they had no choice but to
implement such a policy.)
California has moved beyond the state planning requirement
for housing in two ways. First, its widely used tax increment
financing (TIF) program requires a 20 percent set-aside for
housing for low- (80 percent of the countywide median
income) and moderate- (80 to 120 percent) income families.
(Unfortunately, as several interviewees told us, the require-
ment obligated cities merely to set aside the increment; only
in the 1990s was actual use of the increment mandated.
Thus, while some local governments enthusiastically use
their TIF set-aside for affordable housing, others have report-
edly set aside their set-asides in a bank account.) Second,
California recently began a Workforce Housing Reward
Program that provides financial incentives to cities and coun-
ties that issue building permits for low- and very low-income
households. Local governments that are in compliance with
the housing element receive grants based on the number of
bedrooms in qualifying rental or ownership units. These
funds may be used for construction or the acquisition of cap-
ital assets. Washington also has a state inclusionary zoning
requirement.
Housing is frequently seen as an integral part of
city development efforts. States, should actively
encourage cities to think in this way, particularly
in downtown development efforts.
There are three sources of population in any downtown
district: visitors and tourists, workers, and residents. Most
traditional attempts to renew central business districts
focused on the first two sources of pedestrian traffic —
workers and visitors —rather than residents. However, many
of the cities we studied are engaged in efforts to revitalize
their core areas through the development of downtown
housing, with the goal of having a substantial 24-hour
resident population, including a high share of prosperous
households.
When people live in a downtown area, they also generate
shopping and entertainment activity there. People like to mini-
mize their commutes; so if their talents are scarce, businesses
will be inclined to locate closer to scarce pools of talent, thus
resulting in a more vital city center. This approach is a major
improvement over traditional urban renewal efforts that
focused exclusively on commercial development, convention
centers, and hotels.
Community Development
States and cities should see community development
as an integral component of their city vitality strategies.
Recent research has emphasized the importance of ameni-
ties as a factor driving population and job growth in cities and
their metropolitan areas. Cities that are viewed as nice or
pleasant places to live will clearly have an advantage in the
competition for jobs and resources. However, what is some-
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times missed in the discussion of amenities is that people dif-
fer in their preferences and thus in their assessment of what
counts as a nice place to live. This provides policy makers
with wide latitude in deciding how to make the city attractive
to residents and potential residents.
In their efforts to achieve city vitality and amenity
packages, cities should strive for distinctiveness — a
set of attractive living and working conditions that will
set them apart from all other cities.
Cities that are striving to achieve positive amenity character-
istics through their community development efforts — i.e.,
clean and safe streets, interesting neighborhoods, a vital
downtown, a good park system, extensive recreation and
entertainment opportunities, and vitality and distinctiveness
(good schools are also critical, but will be discussed below)—
will not only be competitive in attracting people and jobs, they
will also improve the lives of existing residents. Portland and
Seattle have made their natural environment and intense
localness part of their distinctiveness. Chicago has embraced
its built environment, neighborhoods, and reputation as a
world- class city that is a livable alternative to New York.
Community and economic development efforts should
complement each other rather than be at odds with
each other, as frequently happens in the cauldron of
urban politics.
Some local government investment, frequently supported at
least in part by state funding, such as ballparks, parks and
recreational facilities, or major streetscape improvements,
make more sense when viewed from a community develop-
ment perspective as opposed to an economic development
perspective. Most static analyses of public funding for ball-
parks and other mega-projects suggest that they are unlikely
to generate much, if anything, in the way of jobs or income
for local residents. Instead, they will just divert spending from
other businesses already in the area. However, if they are
seen as a community development component of a
long-term city revitalization strategy, they may serve as a
community amenity that makes the city more attractive for
both existing and prospective residents. Both Lansing and
Durham built minor league baseball stadiums for teams a
decade ago; Lansing straightforwardly justified the expendi-
ture to us in terms of community morale, and Durham used
its park to anchor an area targeted for development. Of
course, community morale must be considered in light of the
economic cost (or benefit) of the project.
Economic and Workforce Development
States should provide local governments with the
tools necessary to meet their needs, including local
economic development tools.
However, states should not give local governments tools
such as local tax concessions that encourage them to com-
pete unproductively against one another. Decisions about
which sub-state areas (i.e., distressed cities or distressed
rural areas) to promote through tax incentives or other
means should be made at the state level.
States often seem to assume that their primary role in local
economic development is to provide local governments with
the authority to offer tax incentives in order to attract
economic activity. Research results suggest that these tax
incentives do not play a major role in regional economic
development; they have little effect other than moving eco-
nomic activity from one locality to another within the region.
Such incentives might make sense for an individual local gov-
ernment to pursue for its own gain in terms of jobs and tax
base. However, it makes little sense in terms of state policy
(unless, of course the state intends to try to move economic
activity from one set of communities to another — from, for
example, a wealthier community to a poorer one, in which
case it should provide incentives only to the community it
wishes to benefit).
State governments should encourage cities to reclaim
degraded assets, especially land, based on potential for
return and risk.
State governments should approach local economic develop-
ment strategically. The most obviously degraded asset is
urban land, and this suggests that the state has a role in mak-
ing land assembly as efficient as possible, both legally and
financially. State authorization of TIFs is one proven means of
making it financially feasible to redevelop degraded land
assets, particularly for infill developments. However, TIFs
have typically been restricted to local revenue sources. If a
project is strategic and transformative for the state, the
source of TIF revenue may be extended to include state
taxes as well.
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Recent brownfields legislation in Michigan, for example,
has encouraged development of previously contaminated
properties. Michigan law protects new, innocent owners
from liability for existing contamination, holds existing
owners liable for cleanup costs only if they caused the con-
tamination, and requires cleanup based on the new land use
(so industrial sites do not need to be cleaned to the same
level as residential sites). The law also authorizes municipali-
ties to develop Brownfields Redevelopment Authorities that
can use TIFs and tax credits to encourage investments in
brownfield redevelopment areas created by local govern-
ments. Other financial options include revolving loan funds
and site assessment and reclamation grants.
We saw several examples of efforts to return vacant land
to productive uses. Durham used the state historic building
tax credit program, which it put on top of the federal historic
tax credit, to redevelop an abandoned downtown tobacco
warehouse into a shopping center. Aurora converted an aban-
doned train roundhouse into a gathering place that combines
a local brewery, a comfortable restaurant, meeting space, a
gallery/exhibit area, and outside café seating. This develop-
ment created a few new jobs but, more importantly, it creat-
ed a new space attractive to the community, especially the
younger, educated segment that Aurora wants to attract.
Oregon reclaimed more than 2,000 units of vacant housing in
Portland and turned them over to CDCs and nonprofits for
development as permanent affordable housing.
States can also support city economic development by set-
ting a state framework conducive to economic growth and
development, part of what we earlier termed “doing the
basics well.” State tax systems, a particularly critical compo-
nent of the basics, are having difficulty keeping up with the
globalization of the economy. Tax receipts have been falling
in relative and, in some places, absolute terms as small
businesses shift their corporate structure to subchapter S
(merging the business’s balance sheet with the owner’s per-
sonal finances and shifting the tax receipt from a corporate
tax payment to a personal tax payment) and as multi-state
and multinational firms use sophisticated accounting meth-
ods to minimize taxes paid. In this context, states have begun
to realize that their tax codes are de facto industrial policies.
Spatial competition for economic activity and the increasing-
ly footloose nature of business means that state and local
government have limited ability to tax business to pay for
services consumed by residents. Going forward, state taxes
will shift to residents through income, wage, sales, and prop-
erty or land taxes. Business taxes will increasingly be
assessed on economic resources that are difficult to move,
such as wages paid to workers and land, or they will be
assessed on instate businesses that serve the local popula-
tion. With the exception of excise or extraction taxes on coal,
gas, oil, and natural gas the ability of state’s to export their tax
burden is diminishing.
Attracting businesses and redeveloping degraded assets are
not the only means of bringing about growth and develop-
ment. In the long run, an area’s economic vitality will depend
on the education and skills of its residents (or its human cap-
ital). Cities can build their human capital either by attracting
highly skilled residents from elsewhere or by educating and
training existing residents. Although these strategies are
clearly not mutually exclusive, they sometimes are treated as
if they are. As several interviewees told us in North Carolina,
both the Research Triangle area and Charlotte have been
extremely successful in attracting educated residents from
throughout the United States; they have been much less
successful in terms of providing sufficient skills to their own
residents through their elementary and secondary education
system. (We address this aspect of education in the next sec-
tion.) As a state official told us, “Our high school outcomes
put us near the bottom or the bottom of the pack for high
schools. [We have a] 30 or 40 percent dropout rate across the
state.”
North Carolina, however, has been the leader among states
that have used their community college system and work-
force development capacity as an economic development
tool. The extensive community college system — the goal is
to have a community college within 20 miles of every North
Carolina resident — focuses on customized training for
specific jobs, frequently in close collaboration with local
businesses, rather than on preparing students for the final
two years of the four-year university system (the 2+2
approach). The North Carolina system is flexible in that it
offers businesses considering locating in the area (or already
there) customized training for potential employees, targeted
to the specific needs of the business. Interviewees in some
of the other states we visited cited North Carolina as the
national leader in providing customized training through the
community college system.
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In both Washington and Oregon, the community college
systems largely serve as the first two years of a bachelor’s
degree. In Washington, community colleges also play a sig-
nificant role in workforce development, offering both degree
and non-degree training programs that are highly flexible and
effectively targeted to current labor market needs.
On the other hand, in Pennsylvania we were told that com-
munity colleges are both under-funded and underutilized.
Despite an original state vision to place community colleges
around the state and use them in strategic ways, the number
of community colleges envisioned shrank, the vision was dis-
solved, and the colleges ended up being plunked down
according to patronage rather than economic strategy, and
with little funding.
In view of the potential importance of universities in
state and urban economic and workforce develop-
ment, states should develop, sustain, and adequately
fund high quality university systems within the state.
States should see their university systems not only as a
means of educating the children of residents, but also as a
way to attract talent from elsewhere.
State government should see its higher education system as
a means of economic and workforce development that has
particular impact on the city and region in which major
research campuses are located. The quality and reputation of
major research universities — such as the University of North
Carolina and Duke in the Research Triangle area, the
University of California near San Francisco, the University of
Chicago and Northwestern in Chicago, the University of
Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, Carnegie-Mellon in Pittsburgh,
and the University of Washington in Seattle — attract large
numbers of students at both the undergraduate and graduate
levels, some of whom stay in the area after they finish their
education, particularly if the area is vital and attractive as a
place to live.
Universities play an important economic role in other ways as
well. The most important products of any university, and the
one most underappreciated in the worlds of economic devel-
opment and public policy, are degrees granted in exchange
for tuition paid. Universities are a major employer, providing
income for a substantial number of residents whose spend-
ing, along with those of students attending the university,
supports other businesses and jobs in the area. Additionally,
we are not aware of a major research university that does
not have a broad and excellent undergraduate program.
The undergraduate program provides stable funding for the
enterprise, is the foundation of its intellectual character, and
establishes a good part of the reputation of the university as
a whole.
Second, universities have the potential to attract employers
by providing deep pools of labor that are scarce in national or
global labor markets. Labor pooling has long been recognized
as a critical source of agglomeration economies. In a technol-
ogy-based economy, labor pooling can trigger a virtuous cycle
of positive feedbacks: Employers come to the region in
search of talent, more talent comes in search of employers,
and on and on. A good example is the concentration of phar-
maceutical companies in the greater Philadelphia region,
attracted by the presence of legal experts who can deal with
the Federal Drug Administration regulatory process.
Third, another underappreciated source of economic develop-
ment activity is the production of knowledge for sale.
Research universities produce knowledge under contract
from governments, foundations, and corporations. The best
of this research is externally funded and driven by the princi-
pal investigator’s curiosity. Externally funded, curiosity-driven
or demand-responsive research produces knowledge that
becomes an exported economic product supporting income
inside the local economy.
A fourth product of research universities — commercial
spin-offs from university-based research — has received
a disproportionate amount of attention in the economic
development community. First, most spin-offs come not
from university labs but from university talent — graduates
who set up their own company or develop products in local
companies. Second, universities license their inventions in
global intellectual property markets. The knowledge will take
root locally only if there is a finance and entrepreneurial base
that can take it to market. Finally, technology will generate
the formation of a company only if it can be translated into a
product. However, the benefit from local, university-based
research has clearly been demonstrated in the Research
Triangle area, the San Francisco Bay, Seattle, and Boston.
In some places universities have also played a more direct
and fundamental role in an area’s economic development.
Research Triangle Park has generated jobs and income in the
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Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill area. Conceived by a state com-
mission appointed by Governor Luther Hodges in 1955,
Research Triangle Park began as an initiative by the three
major area universities — the University of North Carolina,
North Carolina State, and Duke — with funding from the pri-
vate sector. The focus of the Park’s recruitment efforts has
been knowledge-based businesses (it limits the amount of
manufacturing), and over the years these businesses have
worked closely with the local universities.
Education
States should ensure that all children have access to
an adequate education and that they are not denied
that access as a result of insufficient income or the
low tax capacity of the school district in which they
live.
Particularly for larger cities, the viability and quality of local
schools are key elements in bringing about urban vitality.
Poorly performing schools and parents’ fear that their
children will not receive a good education are disincentives
for families with children to stay in cities. Quality public edu-
cation is thus key to city competitiveness. It increases the
willingness and ability of families to live in cities. Well-
performing neighborhood city schools are capitalized in
increased housing prices that enable wealth accumulation for
city owners. High-quality schools have the potential to attract
new businesses, not only because such schools are likely to
produce a well-trained labor force but also because they
make it easier for businesses to recruit employees from out-
side the area.
Unfortunately, city school systems that deliver quality educa-
tion and high graduation rates are rare in U.S. cities, including
those we visited. There are two possible approaches for
cities to take to change this: improve the quality of schools in
large city school systems, or sever the traditional link
between a child’s place of residence and his or her school.
While these strategies are not mutually exclusive, until
recently most effort has been placed on improving the exist-
ing school system, generally with disappointing results. It
appears that schools populated predominantly by children
from low-income families who begin their formal schooling
already behind in skill development are not good learning
environments.
A conventional state response to the failure of city school
systems, sometimes forced upon states by the courts, has
been to increase per-pupil spending through equalization
funding. California, Michigan, and Oregon now have systems
that produce (or will soon produce) nearly equal per-pupil
spending in all school districts. However, this equalization
effort has not necessarily expanded funding for large city
school districts. It may, in fact, have reduced overall funding.
In any case, there has been a longstanding dispute about
whether more money is likely to make a difference in student
outcomes. Recent research, although contested, suggests
that smaller class size does matter in the education of
very young children, particularly those from low-income fam-
ilies. Recent research has also shown that better qualified
teachers, such as those with college degrees in the subjects
they teach (who will cost more money to hire), also make a
difference.
More recently attention has focused on the cognitive deficits
with which many children from low-income families enter
school and the need to expand early education as a means of
dealing with this. State funding for Head Start, which was
never very high, is down in some states, including Oregon,
which cut its state supplementary funds by 11 percent for the
2003-05 period. Washington cut its state supplement
altogether after 2002, making Pennsylvania the only state we
visited that still supplements federal Head Start funds with
state money.15
None of these states has state-financed, universal pre-kinder-
garten (UPK) education, but Illinois Governor Blagojevich
recently announced his intention to make Illinois, which
already has one of the highest-quality and most accessible
pre-K systems in the country, the first UPK state for both
three- and four-year-olds. North Carolina’s “More at 4” pro-
gram uses funding for a variety of pre-K initiatives, including
Head Start, to enhance pre-K education. This program has a
model childcare rating system, which includes standards for
teaching and class sizes.
The second approach is to end the linkage between where
students live and where they attend school. Families with
sufficient resources achieve this by sending their children to
private schools, either religious or secular. We were told that
Grand Rapids has done relatively well in retaining its popula-
tion in part because a large proportion of families, for religious
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reasons, have chosen to send their children to private reli-
gious schools. The decline in public school quality in Grand
Rapids has not driven the middle class to the suburbs simply
because middle-class children were being educated in the
private religious schools. Charter schools and school voucher
programs are two other means of breaking the geographic
link between home and school and providing families with
more education options.
Within the public school system, there has been movement
towards increased choice. Magnet schools and choice within
the public school system are becoming increasingly com-
mon. In fact, with the exception of North Carolina, our case
study states all have public school choice policies in which
parents may enroll their children in any school within their dis-
trict or even in other districts. These policies differ depending
on whether district participation in the program is voluntary,
as in Michigan and Pennsylvania, or mandatory, as in
Washington and Illinois. In North Carolina, although there
is no statewide public school choice policy, several school
districts, including Mecklenburg County (Charlotte), have
adopted an intra-district school choice program.
Both Charlotte and Durham have consolidated their city and
county school districts, with Charlotte known until recently as
one of the most successful desegregated systems in the
country. Students were bussed across city lines to integrate
schools. However, a recent court case eliminated busing, and
we were widely told that the schools are becoming more at
risk. Durham’s system change is more recent, and we heard
mixed reports on its effectiveness. In the years prior to
school system consolidation, the city school system bound-
ary was frozen, and land annexed to the city remained in
the county school system. The consolidation of the city and
county systems dispersed resources into the neglected city
system, and there was a significant improvement.
Less widely hailed is Durham’s division of the consolidated
county school district into wedges that start in the center city
and extend into the suburban parts of the district. Parents can
send their children to any school in the wedge in which they
live. While the system has made strides in achievement
results, observers report that suburban children can stay in
their prior neighborhood school and that inner-city children
are not reaping the expected benefits from an integrated
wedge system. Michigan has instituted, as noted earlier, a
form of cross-district public school choice. A child may attend
school in a district other than where he or she lives if that dis-
trict has agreed to accept enrollees from outside its district.
The incentive for receiving districts is the full per-student
state aid that follows the student to the new district.
Transportation
States should make state transportation funding to
local governments as flexible as possible so that cities
can use the funds to best meet their needs.
Traditionally, state transportation funds have been disbursed
by state highway departments and used primarily for highway
purposes. Changes in federal law have made it easier for fed-
eral transportation funds to be used for public transit, bike-
ways, and walkways as well as highways. Some of the states
we visited (such as California and Oregon) seemed to be avid-
ly embracing these changes, while others (such as Michigan
and Pennsylvania) appeared to continue to be dominated by
a highway mentality. One possible method for encouraging
non-highway transit options is to eliminate such state laws as
the Washington law requiring gas tax revenues to be used
solely for roads. A balance of highway/road, mass transit, and
bicycle and pedestrian travel should be encouraged.
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